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Cohabiting in Time: Towards an ecology
of rhythm
PETER NELSON
Music, School of Arts, Culture and Environment, University of Edinburgh, 12, Nicolson Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9DF, UK
E-mail: p.nelson@ed.ac.uk
Most accounts of rhythm focus on notions of duration,
pulse and metre, to explore the practices and constructs by
which those involved in music performances co-ordinate
their involvement. Yet there is a significant body of musical
practice where sounds co-habit in time, without the same sorts
of constraints found in metric co-ordination: from the gentle
singing of Joseph Beuys during his Action Piece I Like
America and America Likes Me, to Paul McCartney’s song
‘Blackbird’. This is similar, say, to the improvisation practice
of composer and trombonist George Lewis in his work with
the computer programme Voyager. Starting from some ideas
laid out by Gaston Bachelard and Gregory Bateson, and
recent writings on critical post-humanism, this paper explores
ways of considering ecologies of sounds in time, and their
consequences for human musical experience.
The first musical act is listening. Pierre Schaeffer,
among others, implies as much when he asserts
I think that man had to cry out, that man had to singy
but that man, probably, did not perceive music until it
had passed onto an instrument, even if that was a stone,
or a skin stretched on a gourd. Probably man needed to
go outside of himself, to have another object: an
instrument, a machine. (Schaeffer 1971: 56–7)1
Sounds can be made in many different ways, but they
need to be perceived as music, if they are to be music.
What does it mean to hear sounds as music? It seems
to me that any answer to this question must depend
on having some notion of what music is for, and I am
going to start with the assumption that one of the
things music is for is to bind us into time. Thus one of
the first things to consider about music is rhythm.
Acoustic ecology starts from an awareness that
music sounds are only a part of a larger soundscape,
involving sounds that emerge through many different
agencies and under many different categories. As
Schaeffer presents his human narrative, telling of the
consequence of a move from unconscious sound-
making to conscious sound-making, he unleashes
music as a changed perception of sound in general;
an awareness that, as instrumental sound emanates
through human agency, other sounds may have their
own motivating forces and may equally be perceived
as music. This is already clear in many mythological
stories, where naturally occurring sounds are embo-
died in ‘instruments’ played by gods. In Greek
mythology concerning Apollo, for example, the satyr,
Marsyas,
stumbled upon the flute, which he had no sooner put to
his lips than it played of itself, inspired by the memory of
Athene’s music. (Graves 1955: 77)
George Lewis gives a more detailed account of this
contrast of agencies in the production of sounds:
On one of my first visits with Malachi Favors, the great
contrabassist and co-founder of the Art Ensemble of
Chicago, I discussed my interest in using computers to
play music – somehow. Something I had read about –
somewhere. Favors, deploying considerable detail that
I am at pains to remember now, launched into an ani-
mated recollection of his visit with ‘this African brother
who had instruments that played themselves’.
In my ignorance of those years, I remember filing this
remembrance under the category of ‘magic’ – though
Favors never used that word. In retrospect it seems
obvious enough that this taxonomy was evidence of the
heavy rational hand of the academy, leaning on my
shoulder; indeed, I was fresh out of university. With its
privileging of so-called ‘logic’ and ‘facts’ over legend and
oral narrative, the influence of ‘higher learning’ made it
more difficult for me to see that the nonrational is not
the same as the nonimaginable, nor can it be identified
with what is nonrealizable. Favors’ vivid description of
his meeting with this traditional musician, then, was
describing a kind of technology, perhaps different from
my own. It has become clear that the results, however
achieved, essentially parallel the sort of thing I now do
with computers. (Lewis 1999: 99)
This contrast of agencies seems like a key point, since
rhythm, in one reading anyway, is all about agencies
and their interactions.
If we assume that one of the things music is for is to
bind us into time, how does this binding work? The
notion of rhythm as a binding element arises even in
the earliest accounts, as Curt Sachs (1953) points out.
Thus Aeschylos has the captive Prometheus, chained
to a rock, exclaim ‘I am bound here in this rhythm’,1This author’s translation.
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echoing a fragment from Archilochos (from two
hundred years earlier, around 700 BC), where he
strives to ‘understand the rhythm that holds mankind
in its bonds’.
When Aristoxenos defines rhythm as taxis chronon,
‘the order of times’, we see a logical rule governing
the binding. The French psychologist Gaston
Bachelard, in his book The Dialectic of Duration
(1936), provides us with a way of thinking about
the nature of this binding. Bachelard was a follower of
the great French philosopher Henri Bergson, and The
Dialectic of Duration attempts to show that the per-
ception of duration, one of Bergson’s main themes,
is subject to a dialectic or duality. So Bachelard
identifies Bergson’s philosophy as what he calls ‘a
philosophy of plenitude’ – time and experience for
him are full. Bachelard argues for a sort of psycholo-
gical duel between fullness and emptiness, where the
moments of fullness have special meaning for us, and
we have to work at them. However, Bachelard is
concerned not just with the internals of individual
psychology but also with the connections and social
implications of communal perception, and moments
where we have a communal sense of fullness. The
passage I find interesting is as follows:
But the equalisation of timing is already one of the great
tasks of relational psychology. When one has effected
this synchronisation – that is to say, when one has put
precisely together two superpositions of two different
psyches – one sees that one has almost all the attributes
of physical adhesive bonding. The time of thought
marks thought profoundly. Perhaps one is not thinking
the same thing, but one thinks something at the same
time. What a union! (Bachelard 1936: 121)2
And then, about rhythm itself:
The beat acts as a signal, not as a mere duration. It binds
into coincidences, binds rhythms into instants that will
stand out. (Bachelard 1936: 140)
This proposes rhythm as a mechanism for binding
together agencies at moments of mutual time per-
ception, as they are involved in music production and
other communicative experiences. It clearly relates to
a remark of Alfred Einstein, where he says, ‘all our
judgments in which time plays a part are always
judgments of simultaneous events’ (Einstein 1905).
Here we see that, in the domain of rhythm, such
simultaneous events are enacted and judged socially,
not in relation to a clock measurement. One could say
even that these social judgements are culturally con-
structed, with a corresponding variety of conception,
as Curt Sachs (1953) elucidates in some detail. It is
still a question, of course, what the durations between
these ‘instants’ could be full of, in terms of actual
experience (for a fuller discussion of this see Nelson
2010).
A social theory of rhythm would probably go on
to investigate the actual operation of the ‘beat as
signal’, and the ways in which the timing of those
‘simultaneous events’, and the durations between
them, could carry meaning for people. The reason for
talking about rhythm in terms of ‘agencies’ is the
realisation that not all of the ‘agents’ in rhythm need
to be human music participants. As is evident from
the brief discussion of acoustic ecology above, there
are plenty of other sources of sounds which we judge
to be musically potent, and thus implicated in the
experience of rhythm.
The clearest account of this approach to the
rhythmic fabric of the world comes in the first
chapter of Kofi Agawu’s book African Rhythm
(1995), entitled ‘Rhythms of Society’. In this chapter,
Agawu begins:
In order to construct a ‘rhythmic soundscape’ for the
Northern Ewe area, we need to suppress, or at least
underplay, the distinctions between music and non-
musicy (1995: 8)
Agawu then goes on to describe a hypothetical day
cycle, from dawn to dawn:
4.00 am Dawn is a period of growth and emergence, a
time for the rhythms of sleeping and snoring y As
daylight appears, the noises of chickens, goats, sheep
and other domestic animals gradually replace the shrill
and distinct sounds of night. (1995: 9)
And then later:
9.00 am The day’s labours are in full swing everywhere.
y When carpenters nail and drill y they unfailingly
incorporate some sort of pattern into what would
otherwise be a series of undifferentiated pulses. That is
why practically every Northern Ewe child knows the
rhythm transcribed in Example 1.3, a rhythm that
carpenters rehearse hundreds of times a day as they
hammer nails into wood. (1995: 13)
These descriptions already contain three types of
sounds: the unwitting sounds of human bodies, the
sounds of animals, both wild and domesticated, and
the sounds arising from human work activities. How
do these sounds bind their hearers into rhythms, what
sorts of binding might there be, and what is the sig-
nificance of characterising these sound environments
as rhythmic?
It is interesting that Bachelard proposes the
moment of social cohesion as thinking ‘something at
the same time’. This is not a visual or tactile event.
There need be no sound involved to think one at the
same time as another person. The anthropologist
Charles Keil proposes and explains the crucial
significance of this situation when he writes ‘The
power of music is in its participatory discrepancies’2This author’s translation.
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(Keil 1987: 275). In other words, in making music it is
more interesting not to play with exact synchronicity,
but in order to do this one must be aware of where
in time the synchronicity is. One must be able to
think something at the same time, in order to act
at a time of one’s choosing. This is the double
nature of rhythm, allowing both pulse and style. As
Keil asserts, provocatively: ‘Music, to be personally
involving and socially valuable, must be ‘‘out of
time’’ and ‘‘out of tune’’ ’ (1987: 275). Of course this
remark presupposes a culturally acquired knowledge
of both timing and tuning which renders such judge-
ments both possible and meaningful.
Keil bases his observations on the jazz canon,
which clearly involves human participants in acts of
communal music-making. This is a close rhythmic
binding, where the ‘out of time’ intervals are very
small indeed, and there is strong social cohesion of a
particular substance. But there are other sorts of
rhythmic binding. To hear and respond to the sounds
of a non-human agency as music requires a different
order of ‘participatory discrepancy’, none the less
powerful. For the purposes of this paper I have
characterised this as cohabiting in time, but I think
there is a real rhythmic binding in the ways just dis-
cussed, albeit with a different set of thresholds and
qualities. The key to this discussion is what it means
to participate. Keil takes a strong view of the notion
of participation:
I am using the concept of ‘participation’ as defined by
Levy-Bruhl and refined by Owen Barfield. y All
humans were participants once upon a time but I believe
we still experience much music, and perhaps other
portions of reality in this way. I also believe we need
more of this participatory consciousness if we are to get
back into ecological synchrony with ourselves and with
the natural world. y Participation is the opposite of
alienation from nature, from society, from the body,
from laboury (Keil 1987: 275–6)
This strong identification with the other agent(s),
really with what Bachelard describes as ‘all the
attributes of physical adhesive bonding’, is the sense
of shared temporality, caring and respect which a
sense of rhythm invokes. The participatory dis-
crepancies assert one’s own agency in action, as the
ability to bind to the common sense of pulse asserts
one’s social cohesion. As Keil says, this sense of
identification can bond us to the natural world
as well as to other human participants. The notion
of co-habiting arises from a more post-humanist
view of what identification might mean, but none
the less proposes a rhythmic binding between human
and non-human agencies. In this reading, humans
have no natural priority, and may develop as yet
unclear methods of alterity allowing identification
and communication outside the norms of inter-
human relationships. These could still be rhythmic.
An example of what I mean might be heard in Paul
McCartney’s song ‘Blackbird’.
‘Blackbird’ appears on the Beatles’ ‘White Album’ of
1968. McCartney sings two verses and two choruses
to a simple guitar accompaniment, and a steady pulse
which sounds like the click of a record skipping a
groove. Already in that beat we have a non-human
agency, which pulls us into the world of the turntable
and which emphasises the discrepancies in McCartney’s
moving around of the beat as ‘human’. The sound
world is highly intimate, juxtaposing a close proximity
to the voice and guitar, and the sensation of the
background click as ‘amplified’. Then a recording of a
blackbird appears, and McCartney sings the final verse
and chorus in duet with the bird. The sound-world
opens out, but the bird partakes of the previous feeling
of involvement and intimacy. There is no rhythmic
co-ordination in the normal sense; the two participants
co-habit the temporal space, yet there is a strong sense
of identification between them. The balance in the mix
is equal; there is no feeling that the birdsong is back-
ground colour, and the tension between the two sets of
time events sets up a rhythmic interplay which binds
the one into the other in a fashion which most human
music-making does not countenance.
That is not to say that human musicians are not
susceptible to this sort of rhythmic binding, which
Curt Sachs terms ‘non-adaption’. Of non-adaption,
he says, ‘Much as the co-operation of voices and
instruments enhances a common rigid rhythm, we
have to accept the bewildering fact that the two
media often remain independent of one another’
(Sachs 1953: 43). The example he gives is from the
music of the Chippewa or Ojibwe people of North
America, of which he relates:
One of the most unexpected experiencesy is to hear the
regular drumbeat of the accompanist follow a tempo
entirely different from that of the voice. In one song of
the Chippewa, the singer would proceed, say, in quarter
notes of M.M. 168, and the drummer, much more
slowly, in M.M. 104. Or the other way round,y (this)
testifies to a more or less total independence of the two
media and their perception. (Sachs 1953: 43–4)
The crucial point here seems to be separation not just
of tempos but of agencies, of voice and drum. The
drum is proposed almost as one of those ‘instruments
that played themselves’. As in the McCartney example,
the interesting thing is the mix of agencies, which goes
neatly with contemporary notions of critical post-
humanism (see Wolfe 2009), where the music we
make might go alongside, rather than merely imitate,
or dominate the sounds of the animals with whom we
share the planet – I’m thinking here also of the gentle
singing of Joseph Beuys during his Action Piece
I Like America and America Likes Me, where he shared
his living space for three days with a wild coyote,
during which time ‘The coyote’s behaviour shifted
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throughout the three days, becoming cautious, detached,
aggressive and sometimes companionable’.3 What do
we learn by considering the rhythmic aspects of these
sharing environments?
One of the consequences of the revelation of the
dual nature of rhythm through the notion of partici-
patory discrepancy is the uncovering of a mechanism
for style. Keil investigates two stylistic approaches to
jazz drumming which he characterises as ‘on top’ and
‘laid back’, both in reference to the discrepant timing
relationship between the drum tap and the shared,
notional pulse. But once there is identification between
any two sets of sound events the same stylistic
mechanism opens up. Style itself is clearly dependent
on specific cultural paradigms, so the meaningfulness
of the Chippewa drumming, for example, may be
opaque to many. But all of us are able to decode, in
our own ways, the dimensions of discrepant timing,
and to give a sense of style – and thus meaning – to
rhythmic relationships which we feel bound into. The
first musical act is listening. This decoding is perhaps
the activity that we engage when we identify a sound-
world as music, whether as actor or audience partici-
pants. Our attention is the conduit of the binding.
Of course the key element in Bachelard’s account
of rhythmic binding is the unified beat, understood
between participants, and there is no such beat pre-
sent in the McCartney and the Beuys examples, or in
Sachs’ notion of non-adaptation. But a co-existence
or multiplicity of beats is common in music. So in his
discussion of African musical culture, Frith, citing the
work of the ethnomusicologist John Chernoff, notes
that in polyrhythmic music the social participants ‘resist
the tendency to fuse the parts’, or, more precisely: ‘The
music is perhaps best considered as an arrangement of
gaps where one may add a rhythm, rather than as a
dense pattern of sound’ (Frith 1996: 147).
This is a particular sort of temporal co-habitation
where identification with the other is bound not to a
coincidence but to a making-way. Bachelard’s bonding
mechanism is still at work, but multiply, and the
timing discrepancies at the heart of style are still
apprehensible with respect to the gaps. The micro-
timing of when and how these are filled matters as
much as the relation of the sounds in any one ‘voice’ to
their intended pulse.
The style apparent in the McCartney song is
experienced as a juxtaposition of rhythms with utterly
separate intentionalities, and that seems to me to be
part of its beauty. The various agreements and dis-
crepancies of timing arise from the co-habiting of
human and non-human agencies, and in this example
the relationship is clearly skewed in one direction:
McCartney can hear the bird, but the bird cannot
hear him. In the Beuys example, this is no longer the
case. Here the exchange of sound can be char-
acterised as participation in Keil’s strong sense, by all
participants, and the range of agencies involved
makes an equally strong musical and ecological
statement. Life processes and adaptations are evident
in both Beuys and the coyote, mediated rhythmically
through sounds (and probably, in this instance,
through other senses too).
The notion of a performance ecosystem can clearly
be seen to implicate rhythm, and what is interesting
here is to see how the same sorts of rhythmic concepts
are revealing about quite different sorts of perfor-
mance situations. Although these concepts concern
agencies more than habitats, one could argue that
mixes of different types of agencies might in them-
selves constitute sorts of habitats for music. One of
the most interesting and revealing of these is the mix
of human performer and computer. This situation
has already come to light in the discussion of how
agencies have been attributed to sounds that arise
without human intention, and the composer, trom-
bonist and improviser George Lewis is one of the
most interesting investigators of this performance
habitat.
In an interview with Brian Lonergan, Lewis gives a
nice account of what he feels is involved in the act of
music improvisation:
The idea is that improvisation in music, or in any domain,
is a matter of exchange – exchange of sound, exchange of
personal and cultural narrative, exchange of histories and
so onyMusic gets exciting to me when I can empathise
with people who are doing it. (Lonergan n.d.)
In the context of the discussion above, one could
foresee narratives and histories attaching also to non-
human agencies, and Lewis himself goes on to discuss
this possibility:
That’s why I like improvisation so much, because there’s
a sense of empathy and you can place yourself inside the
other person’s consciousness and you can become part
of them and try to plumb their motivations. Otherwise it
just becomes a lot of cool sounds and that doesn’t
interest me. And so as a composer and computer-
programmer, my job is to create environments where the
computer makes mostly decisions that seem plausible
and try to reduce the number of bonehead moves that it
makes. (Lonergan n.d.)
The important point about Lewis’s computer pro-
gram, Voyager, in the context of this discussion, is that
the program is an independent producer of sounds and
not in any way ‘controlled’ by a human performer.
Lewis’s own description of it goes as follows:
Voyager is a non-hierarchical, interactive musical
environment that privileges improvisation. In Voyager,
improvisers engage in dialogue with a computer-driven,
interactive ‘virtual improvising orchestra’. A computer
3From the Tate Modern website: http://www.tate.org.uk/modern/
exhibitions/beuys/room4.shtm (accessed 13 November 2010).
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program analyses aspects of a human improviser’s
performance in real time, using that analysis to guide an
automatic composition (or, if you will, improvisation)
program that generates both complex responses to the
musician’s playing and independent behaviour that
arises from its own internal processes. (Lewis 2000: 33)
It is, in the terms discussed above, in the category of
‘instruments that played themselves’. The very idea
that the system might, or might not make ‘bonehead
moves’ is an attribution of history and narrative to a
non-human agency, necessary for the process of
improvisation as Lewis describes it. In a further gloss
on the performance situation, he says:
I conceive a performance of Voyager as multiple parallel
streams of music generation, emanating from both the
computers and the humans – a nonhierarchical, impro-
visational, subject-subject model of discourse, rather
than a stimulus/response setup. (Lewis 2000: 34)
What is the rhythmic ecology of this environment?
The important lesson from the discussion of
Bachelard’s analysis of the notion of the beat is that
it proposes one of the essential moments of rhythm
as a moment of social integration. And as Simon
Frith so clearly shows us, in the two chapters on
rhythm in his book Performing Rights (1996), social
integration is one of the things that rhythm is for.
Bachelard simply provides an account of a mechan-
ism which neatly underpins it. Thus a rhythmic
account of the nature of a performance of Voyager
proposes the connection of human and computer
agencies as socially integrated participants in time.
Lewis himself is quite explicit about the participant
nature of the situation:
The incorporation and welcoming of agency, social
necessity, personality and difference as aspects of ‘sound’
distinguish such music from work that ‘incorporates’ or
‘uses’ improvisationy ‘Sound’ becomes identifiable, not
with timbre alone, but with the expression of personality,
the assertion of agency, the assumption of responsibility
and an encounter with history, memory and identity.
(Lewis 2000: 37)
As the discussion above has tried to show, this
expression happens, at least in part, through the
decoding of temporal relationships under the sign
of rhythm, where the rhythmic bindings can be of
various sorts. Voyager invokes an ecology which Lewis
characterises as ‘jampack and jelly-tight’ (Lewis 2000:
36), not just as some sort of aesthetic choice, but
as a characteristic of a particular ethos of social
integration, in time.
The inclusion of animal voices in this discussion
is intended not just as an illuminating foil for the
discussion of agency in the use of technological
apparatus in making music, but is more specifically a
consequence of a line of thought about art developed
by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson. In his essay
‘Style, Grace and Information in Primitive Art’,
Bateson argues that
man is as if displaced sideways and lacks that grace
which the animals have y art is a part of man’s quest
for grace; sometimes his ecstasy in partial success,
sometimes his rage and agony at failure. (Bateson 1967a:
128–9)
In this light, the flute that ‘played of itself ’ and the
song of the blackbird are images of grace, and our
ability to bind to their rhythms is a sign of our own
possible alterity. Bateson’s analysis of the matter goes
as follows:
I shall argue that the problem of grace is fundamentally
a problem of integration and that what is to be inte-
grated is the diverse parts of the mind – especially those
multiple levels of which one extreme is called ‘con-
sciousness’ and the other the ‘unconscious’. For the
attainment of grace, the reasons of the heart must be
integrated with the reasons of the reason. (Bateson
1967a: 129)
From the discussion above, it seems to me that
rhythm is one, powerful, way in which integration,
whether in a personal, social or ecological sense, can
be accomplished, and that the mechanisms of inte-
gration are diverse and sophisticated: we are not
talking here about a dull shackle of entrainment to a
beat. The notion of a potent performance ecosystem
would be one in which the possibilities for rhythmic
binding and participation are varied and subtle, and
involve explicit potential for identifications outside of
the narrow confines of human agency and current
human modes of communication.
In another essay, ‘Form, Substance and Differ-
ence’, Bateson expands on the particular power of the
discrepant relationship between humans and animals:
Blake noted that ‘A tear is an intellectual thing’, and
Pascal asserted that, ‘The heart has its reasons of which
the reason knows nothing’. We need not be put off by
the fact that the reasonings of the heart (or of the
hypothalamus) are accompanied by sensations of joy or
grief. These computations are concerned with matters
which are vital to mammals, namely, matters of rela-
tionship, by which I mean love, hate, respect, depen-
dency, spectatorship, performance, dominance, and so
on. These are central to the life of any mammal and I see
no objection to calling these computations ‘thought’,
though certainly the units of relational computation are
different from the units which we use to compute about
isolable things. (Bateson 1967b: 470)
In the same way, I would like to say, following
Bateson, that we also listen to the rhythmic interplays
of music with our sense of mammalian ‘social inter-
action’, informed by ‘what we are in the process of
becoming’ through our histories of ‘human-technology
couplings’ (see Roden 2010). In rhythms, we hear
these relationships being played out, not symbolically
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in Wagnerian leitmotifs but actually: between one
player and another, between each player and their
instrument, between human sound and animal sound,
between human agency and machine agency. What
we are present at, and attentive to, during music is an
interplay which is now, which is why it is fascinating,
rather than a representation of something imaginary.
A performance ecosystem is characterised by our
strong participation, attention and action in time.
The power of music lies in its social and relational
dynamics, and these are not abstract strategies but
real material.
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